Communications and transit > Air transport co-operation committee : minutes of the first session : held at Geneva from July 8th to 12th, 1930

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Sir W. Sefton Brancker thought that this question was much the most important of those
submitted to the Committee. He would like to illustrate that point by an example, and he thought
that his French and Netherlands’ colleagues could give very similar examples. An aircraft leaving
England for the East could cross Europe without difficulty. Trouble would begin, however, when
it neared the East and was over Persia, for example. The agreement with that country was about
to expire and no one knew what the future regime would be. Persia might adopt a restrictive
interpretation of Article 15, and it might not be possible for the aircraft to fly over her territory.
Italy had already given a restrictive interpretation to the agreement, and the route had had to be
changed. Those conditions made the normal operation of air traffic impossible. It was necessary
to ascertain a sufficient time in advance the conditions under which the journey would be effected,
so that the necessary arrangements could be made to remove difficulties, organise a suitable air
fleet, etc. For instance, if an aircraft flew from London to India, it should be free to use the
Cologne-Nuremburg or Paris-Nuremburg route, and there was no likelihood of Germany or
France objecting to one of those routes being used one week and the other the next ; the same
applied to the routes via Prague or Vienna, via Constantinople or the Mediterranean, via the Persian
Gulf or overland, according to the time of year, etc. In short, an aircraft must be allowed to change
its route. That was what he understood by the freedom of the air.
M. Molfese said that Sir W. Sefton Brancker was under a misapprehension in regard to the
negotiations between Italy and Great Britain. It was not true that Italy had asked for economic
compensation or reciprocity, which was usual in contracts of that kind. His country had simply
offered to operate the portion of the line Genoa-Alexandria (Egypt) in conjunction with Great
Britain. Italy had defrayed the cost of that part of the service under the pool system which had
always been recommended by the Committee. England had started to operate the service, had
drawn the profits and had obtained all the desired facilities in Italy ; at a certain moment, however,
the British Government had declared that it had no recollection of having undertaken certain
engagements and it was at that stage that Italy, considering that her co-operation was at an end,
had resumed her freedom of action.
Sir W. Sefton Brancker explained that the British interpretation of Article 15 was as follows :
Once Great Britain had decided that the best route for a service from Great Britain to its colonies
in Asia was over Italian territory, it should have been sufficient for it to notify that country of
its decision, after which the service would begin without any need for special negotiations.
M. Fisch, referring to M. de Veer’s proposal, thought that what the Committee had to decide
was whether it was advisable to study the question of a greater freedom for air lines than at present
exists. Moreover, there was no need to mention the C. I. N. A. M. de Veer’s proposal was to some
extent similar to paragraph 5 of M. Bouche’s proposals. Personally, he thought that the whole
question might be settled by paragraph 5, but if M. de Veer did not agree, perhaps he would consent
to modify his text as follows :
“The Committee recommends that the competent bodies should study the question of
greater freedom than exists at present for regular air lines. In order to arrive at a more
satisfactory solution, the Committee recommends the respective authorities of the various
countries to treat requests for permission to operate regular air lines in as liberal a spirit as
possible.”
M. de Veer said that he was prepared to agree to M. Fisch’s suggestion.
M. Molfese was also in favour of M. Fisch’s amendment. The present Committee included
a number of representatives of countries which were members of the C. I. N. A. and had given
definite votes in that Commission, and it would be awkward for them if they were obliged to vote
differently in another Committee.
M. Fisch explained that each country, while displaying as liberal a spirit as possible, would
have the right to reply to requests in whatever manner it thought fit, according to its own
requirements, and the rights accorded under Article 15 should be reserved.
M. Sondermayer thought it his duty to explain the desire of countries which stood in a
somewhat special position in the matter. While maintaining the principle of the sovereignty of
each State over its territory, Yugoslavia had never availed itself of the provisions of Article 15,
and all requests from foreign companies had been favourably considered. That country had always
been and would continue to be inspired by a desire for the international development of aviation.
Nevertheless, present circumstances made a certain amount of distrust inevitable. There would
be no difficulty if all the companies which applied to Yugoslavia were animated by the same desire,
but, without mentioning any names, he knew of one foreign company which, without any economic
necessity, wished the air service crossing Yugoslavia to be operated by its national aircraft. It was
obvious that a claim of that kind was contrary to the spirit of international co-operation which
should govern the matter.
M. Ruiz Ferry supported, with regard to Spain, the observations of M. Sondermayer and
added that he could mention not one but several cases of the same kind.
Colonel Filipowicz agreed with M. Molfese. The Committee included several representatives
of Governments members of the C. I. N. A., and it would not be possible for them to give their vote