Encyclopaedia Britannica > Volume 3, Anatomy-Astronomy

634 A R
Army, any mischief. Lastly, if it was desired to form the legion
in three continuous lines, this was instantly effected by
simply closing up the intervals between the manipules of the
first and second lines; the Enamor reserve being, as we have
already said, drawn up in a continuous formation, except
when it became necessary to open a passage for elephants.
And all these various evolutions were performed with a
rapidity and precision which have seldom been equalled
and never surpassed by the troops of any other nation.
At a later period, however, the Roman tacticians em¬
ployed a different order of battle, distinguished for its
greater compactness and solidity, as well as for the facility
and rapidity with which it might be formed from the order
of march, even in presence of the enemy. According to
this method each manipule of the legion formed only a single
rank in its order of battle; consequently the two classes
* of hastati and principes, ranged each upon its first manipule
as a front, formed two lines ten deep. But as each man
occupied three feet every way, and as the lines were se¬
parated by an interval equal to half the extent of their
front, it is obvious that each line occupied a front of 120
yards, by from ten to twelve yards in depth; and that
they were separated from each other by an interval of about
60 yards. Again, at an equal distance in i-ear of the prin¬
cipes, the triarii formed the reserve of the legion in the
third line; and the whole, ranged in this manner in three
lines, constituted a square order, as deep as it was broad ;
while the turmce of the cavalry covered the flanks of the
lines, and the eagle or standard of the legion was intrust¬
ed to the keeping of theprimipilus on the right of the line
of the triarii. This order, usually denominated legio quad-
rala, was that adopted by all skilful generals when in pre¬
sence of an enemy. But the different legions composing an
army were ranged upon the same principle, with reference
to one another, as the different ranks of the same legion;
in other words, they were formed en echelon ; each legion¬
ary line thus making one of the sections of the column,
and the baggage occupying the intervals, while the velites
covered the flanks. In this order of march, if the enemy
threatened an attack on the front, each legion in succes¬
sion formed line with that at the head of the column; the
second almost in an instant, the third somewhat later, and
the fourth, or the most remote, in about seven minutes,
which were accounted sufficient for developing the order
of battle on the front. But the order of battle on the
flank was of still more rapid formation. For, the baggage
withdrawing from between the sections, and assembling
on the side opposite to the enemy, each legion executed
what is technically called a quart de conversion on its/ws-
tati, and the whole army immediately found itself in order
of battle ; two minutes being sufficient for the performance
of this simple evolution. It seems evident, then, that the
, celebrated quadratum agmen of the Romans, which has
hitherto been so often treated of, and so little understood,
consisted of a certain number of legiones quadrates dispos¬
ed en echelon, or at least in column, as we have just de¬
scribed : and, from the advantages of this order of march,
particularly its rapid convertibility into an order of battle
either on the front or the flank, it is easy to understand
the reason why the Roman historians have censured so
severely the generals who neglected to adopt it in presence
of the enemy. So much, then, for Roman tactics, as con¬
nected with the elementary formation of those brigades
or divisions which constituted the units of Roman armies.
M Y.
The distinguishing characteristic of the legion consisted Army,
in its astonishing mobility, united with its power of pre-
serving its order of battle undisturbed, and of constant¬
ly rallying when forced to give way. It possessed a sort
of flexibility which enabled it to adapt itself to every
change and variety of circumstances; and no other mili¬
tary body, perhaps, ever executed so numerous evolutions
in the presence of an enemy. Its attack was impetuous
and formidable; but if that failed, it then displayed its
most characteristic excellence, by fighting in retreat. In
this way it vanquished the phalanx, although it was un¬
able to withstand the direct shock of that dense body in
the open field. At the battle where Flaminius defeated
Philip in Thessaly, the Macedonian phalanx gained con¬
siderable ground on the legions ; but the Romans, although
forced to give way, preserved their order,—returned repeat¬
edly to the charge,—and, even while in the act of retiring,
extended their line so as to gain the flank of the Greeks.
Philip durst neither accelerate his march, nor send out
any detachment in pursuit; so that twenty manipules had
time to turn his flank and fall upon his rear, which
speedily decided the fate of the battle. As the phalanx
acted with long pikes, and in close order, the least de¬
rangement caused by the ardour of the soldier in pursuit,
or by inequality of ground in its march, necessarily ex¬
posed it to the legion ; which, dividing itself into a number
of separate corps with the same facility that it formed one
corps and one line, possessed the power of attacking it on
two or more sides at the same time. “ La legion doit
done,” says Guischardt, “ etre envisagee sous deux faces.
Comme infanterie en bataille contre une autre infanterie,
elle eut son ordonnance particuliere a rangs et files diverts,
conformement a ses armes; et alors elle n’eut rien de
commun avec la phalange. Lorsqu’elle a eu de la cava-
lerie en tete, elle cessa d'avoir son ordonnance particu¬
liere.”1 This wise distinction rendered the legion formi¬
dable alike to every nation on which Rome chose to make
war ;2 but neither as infantry against infantry, nor as in¬
fantry prepared to resist cavalry, which duty was princi¬
pally performed by the triarii, until all distinction of
classes and arms merged in a homogeneous formation, had
it any thing in common with the phalanx; for its victo¬
ries, no less than its reverses, had demonstrated the in¬
utility of deep formations, and showed that its real power
depended on its distributive rather than its concentrative
energies,—on its mobility and flexibility rather than on
its weight or impulsion. Hence, on the day of Pharsalia,
it was remarked, as an extraordinary circumstance, that
Pompey had formed his legions ten deep; a novelty which,
as every schoolboy knows, served no other purpose, on
that occasion, except to add to the carnage.
In following the Romans in their wars under the em¬
perors, we find their discipline and their tactics declining
from age to age, in the same manner as they had advanced
and improved. The spirit of change, though productive
of some ameliorations, proved ultimately fatal to the le-
• gion. As long as the Romans continued faithful to the
precepts and rules of the ancient masters, their infantry
maintained its superiority: in proportion as these were
departed from it declined; until at length, having lost
all its distinctive qualities, it was constantly beaten and
overthrown by the numerous cavalry of the barbarians.
To ascribe the gradual declension and ultimate fall of this
infantry to luxury, refinement, love of ease, corruption of
* Mhnoires Militavres, tom. i. p. 84.
2 The cavalry of the Parthians, though peculiarly formidable, durst not attack the legions commanded by Marc Antony, and con¬
fined itself to harassing them from a distance with its arrows. At the battle of Nicopolis, a single legion of the army of Domitius
defeated and put to flight the whole cavalry of king Pharnaces ; and, with a handful of infantry and some horse, Pompey defied the
numerous cavalry of king Oroses.