New volumes of the Encyclopædia Britannica > Volume 30, K-MOR

UNITED KINGDOM]
LAW
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from the master to the judge in chambers. Formerly
there was an appeal from the judge in chambers to a
divisional court in every case and thence to the Court of
Appeal, until the multiplication of appeals in small inter¬
locutory matters became a scandal. Under the Act of
1894 (57 and 58 Yict. c. 16, sec. 1) there is no right of
appeal to the Court of Appeal in any interlocutory matters
(except those mentioned in subs, (b)) without the leave of
the judge or of the Court of Appeal, and in matters of
“practice and procedure” the appeal lies (with leave)
directly to the Court of Appeal from the judge m
chambers. ...
The Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division consists
of the president and one puisne judge. To it are assigned
all causes and matters over which the Court of
Divorce’ Probate, or the Court for Divorce and Matri-
and monial Causes, or the High Court of Admiralty
Admiralty Fad exclusive jurisdiction before the Judicature
Division. Act> But; any cause or matter assigned to
this division may be heard at the request of the President
of the High Court by any other judge of the High Court.
The union of the admiralty with the probate and divorce
business in one division is an interesting relic of the
time when the jurisdiction in admiralty, probate, and
matrimonial causes was confined to the civilians in
Doctors’ Commons.
There are two registrars of the probate and divorce
side of the division. In contentious matters they perform
similar duties to those performed by the masters in the
King’s Bench Division, and during the long vacation they
exercise most of the powers of the judges as to matters
heard upon motion (20 and 21 Yict. c. i 7, sec. 44). In non-
contentious matters they issue grants of probate in common
form and letters of administration, and exercise a general
control over the procedure in the district registries of the
court. There are a registrar and an assistant-registrar on
the admiralty side of the division. The office of the
registrar is of some antiquity. They hear interlocutory
applications in pending actions, and they tax costs. Ihe
more important part of their duties is to act as referees
on references to them, “ assisted by merchants,” to assess
damages in collision and salvage cases, and to^ take
accounts on all matters within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the court. _
The keystone of the structure is a strong Court of
Appeal. Changes have from time to time been made in
the constitution of this court.1 As constituted
Court of 1902, it consisted of ex-officio members and
Pt>ea" five ordinary members, who are styled Lords
Justices of Appeal. The ex-officio members are the Lord
Chancellor, every person who has held the office of Lord
Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the
Rolls, and the President of the Probate, &c. Division. It
usually sits in two divisions of three judges, under the
presidency of the Master of the Rolls and the senior Lord
Justice. The Lord Chancellor, when not engaged in the
judicial business of the House of Lords, frequently sits in
the court, and the other ex-officio judges also sit when
their presence is required, owing to the absence of any of
the Lords Justices from illness or public engagements.
Lord Herschell, after he ceased to be Lord Chancellor,
not unfrequently sat. All courts, however good, have a
tendency to run in grooves, and it is eminently desirable
to secure such variety in the composition and presidency
of this court as will counteract that tendency, and com¬
mand general confidence for their decisions. It was
fortunate that the services were secured of such men (to
1 1875 (38 and 39 Viet. c. 77, sec. 4) ; 1881 (44 and 45 Viet. c. 68,
secs. 2, 4); 1884 (47 and 48 Viet. c. 61, sec. 3) ; 1891 (54 and 55
Viet. c. 43, sec. 1).
speak only of those who have gone) as Lord Selborne, Lord
Cairns, Sir George Jessel, Lord Justice James, Lord Justice
Mellish, Lord Bramwell, Lord Esher, Lord Justice Cotton,
and Lord Bowen in building up the new system.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal extends to (1)
appeals from decrees and orders of all the divisions of the
High Court; (2) appeals from the Court of Chancery of
the county palatine of Lancaster) (3) appeals from the
Court of Chancery of the county palatine of Durham (52
and 53 Yict. c. 47, sec. 11) ; (4) appeals from the railway
commissioners on questions of law (51 and 52 Viet. c. 25,
secs. 17 and 55); (5) applications for a new trial or to
set aside a verdict, finding, or judgment after trial by a
jury (53 and 54 Yict. c. 44, sec. 1); (6) appeals from the
Lord Chancellor or any other person having jurisdiction m
lunacy; (7) appeals from orders of the Liverpool Court of
Passage (Anderson v. Dean, 1894, 2 Q. B. 222); (8) appeals
from error on the record from the Lord Mayor s Court (Le
Blanche v. Heaton Telegram Co., 1 Ex.D. 408) ; and (9)
last but not least, appeals from a county court judge or
arbitrator on a case stated under the Workmen’s Compen¬
sation Act, 1897, 60 and 61 Viet. c. 27, Sched. 2 (4).
By a letter of request of the Lord Chancellor, under sec.
51 of the Lunacy Act (53 and 54 Yict. c. 5) the Lords
Justices are entrusted with the jurisdiction of the judge m
lunacy, and act as additional judges of the Chancery
Division for the purpose of making orders in Chancery as
well as lunacy when necessary. Practically, therefore, the
Court of Appeal exercises the entire lunacy jurisdiction.
It has been doubted whether the reference to the “ Court
of Appeal” in Sched. 2 (4) of the Workmen’s Compensa¬
tion Act, 1897, was not a mistake, and it has been thought
that what was intended was the court exercising appellate
iurisdiction from county courts, viz., a divisional court of
the King’s Bench Division. But the construction of the
Act is free from ambiguity, and numerous appeals have
been entertained, with the result that there is a further
appeal in England to the House of Lords whereas
neither in Scotland nor (it is believed) m Ireland is
there any such appeal. This, however, was not the only
anomaly or difficulty in this singularly ill drawn Act Ihe
iurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is subject to the follow¬
ing exceptions (1) orders of the High Court in appeals
from inferior courts, unless leave be obtained tlie court
by which the order is made, or of the Court of Appeal;
(2) orders of the High Court in registration and election
cases without the like leave; (3) orders made by consent
of parties, or as to costs only which by law are left to
the discretion of the court; (4) certain mterlocutory
orders mentioned in see. 1 of the Act of 1894 (57 and 58
Yict. c. 16) ; (5) orders made in any criminal cause or
matter, save for some error of law apparent on the record,
as to which no question shall have been reserved for the
Court for Crown Cases Reserved; (6) orders of the Admiralty
Division in cases of prize, the appeal from which lies to
His Majesty in Council. The right of appeal is also
subject to this limitation, that it does not extend to
matters which from their nature were not appealabie to
any court before the Judicature Act, or m which the
Court of Appeal has no means of euforcing
its judgment, and therefore it was held m the House ot
Lords ^overruling the Court of Appeal, that no appeal lies
from the order of a judge discharging a prisoner under
a writ of habeas corpus (Cox v. Hakes, 15 A.C. 50b).
“If ” said Lord Herschell, “the contention of the respond¬
ent ’is to prevail, the statute has effected a grave constitu-
t."ml chaugT” and later, “if the High Court “has
inherited the combined powers of the courts whose
functions were transferred to it, but none of them had
any jurisdiction or authority to review a discharge by a