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C&MPARiSON.
II
We fliall now confuler die nature of thofe objects,
from which comparifons 5iould be drawn.
In the firft place they (nud not be drawn from things,
which have too near and obvious a refemblance of the
- objedt, with which they are compared. The pleafure,
we receive from the a£t of comparing, arifes from the
diicovery of likendfes among things of different Ipeciei,
where we fhould not at firft fight expedt a refem¬
blance.
Bat in the fecond place, as comparifons ought not
to be founded on likeneffes too obvious ; much lefs
ought they to be founded on thofe, which are too faint
and diftant. Thefe raftead of affifting ftrain the fancy
to comprehend them, and throw no light upon the fub-
jeft.
In the third place the objedt, from which a compari-
fon is drawn, ought never to be an unknown objedt,
nor one, of which few people can have a clear idea.
Therefore fimilies, founded on philofophical difcoveries,
or on any thing, with which perfons of a particular
trade only, or a particular profeflion, are acquaintfcu,
produce not their proper effedt. They ftiould be drawn
from thofe illuftrious and noted objedts, which moft
readers have either feen, or can ftrongly conceive.
( In the fourth place in compofitions of a ferious or
elevated kind fimilies fhould never be drawn from low