An essay about colonies and dynasties.
With the hostile relations between the UK, USA, and Iran prominently in the news once again, it is timely to revisit some of the fundamental causes of the 1979 revolution in Iran and its consequences.
During the 1980s and since, Anglo-American relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (founded in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini) have been tense, with moments of dangerous rhetoric and violent engagement. But things weren't always so. How did the United States go from being a long-standing friend of Iran to the 'Great Satan'? The causes date back to at least the turn of the century, with their roots in British colonial exploitation, anti-democratic, monarchical rule and foreign interference.
In 1901 British geologist William Knox D'Arcy discovered huge oil reserves in Iran and purchased the rights for a bargain price with the 'exclusive privilege to search for, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and ozokerite throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire for a term of sixty years'. The so-called D'Arcy Concession enabled the site at Abadan to become the largest oil refinery in the world. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) — later called British Petroleum (BP) — paid royalties and tax to Iran, but was wholly British controlled. Britain's investment in Iran included supplying equipment and training for military purposes, building roads and improving infrastructure; in fact, this was all paid for by Iran with a British loan of £2 million secured by 'customs revenue' (i.e. from oil), thereby consolidating Britain's grip over Iran.
For centuries Persia/Iran had been a monarchy, with various dynasties vying for supremacy. By the time of the D'Arcy Concession, pressure for reform was building and in 1906 the ruler, Ahmad Shah Qajar, bowed to popular pressure for reform and made the country a constitutional monarchy, with its first Majlis (parliament). By 1925 the Pahlavi dynasty had usurped the Qajar dynasty as rulers. During the Second World War, Iran declared neutrality; however, the British and Russians, fearing the Germans would seize oil supplies, invaded in 1941. The British ejected the Shah and installed his more compliant son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.
After the war there was a call for social and political change, as well as a desire to be free from outside interference. The nationalist and left/liberal forces, namely the Communist Tudeh Party and the National Front Party (NF), led the movement. In 1950 Haj Ali Razmara was appointed Prime Minister by the Shah (with the urging of the British Government and the Company — significantly, Razmara was opposed to the nationalisation of AIOC). Razmara's tenure was short. He was assassinated in March 1951 by a member of a nationalist/Islamist group, and with the threat of more political violence, by May that year the Shah was obliged to accept the NF leader Mohammed Mossadegh as Prime Minister. Mossadegh was a liberal, nationalist politician who immediately set about achieving his main aims, namely the restoration of democracy in Iran through the Majlis (parliament), and control over the country's oil reserves through nationalisation.
The AIOC's annual reports and accounts during these turbulent years contain interesting, albeit biased, descriptions of the events surrounding the assassination of President Razmara, the appointment of Mossadegh, the attempted nationalisation of the oil industry, the take-over of the refinery by Iranian Government officials, and the expelling of non-Iranian staff (mainly British and Indian). The company's reports also complained that the Mossadegh Government had broken a 1933 convention (basically revoking the D'Arcy Concession) ratified by the League of Nations: '… Article 21 provided that the Convention shall not be annulled by the (Iranian) Government …' However, the company was being selective; the convention also enshrined improvements to the company's payments to the Iranian Government, as well as raising standards of employment conditions for its Iranian employees. But 20 years after this agreement an American emissary was appalled at the slum housing of the company's Iranian employees, and condemned the colonial attitude of the British.
The AIOC chairman, Scot Sir William Fraser, wished to keep politics and business separate (though with the British Government holding by far the largest share of the AOIC's holdings, this was more of a hope than a reality). He was therefore disinclined to involve officialdom in this crisis, but despite this the matter was presented before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. The Court's recommendations for co-operation were dismissed by the Iranian Government as interference in its internal affairs (in fact, the ICJ declared it had no jurisdiction over the matter).
'Eisenhower … agreed to help the British with "regime change"
After threats to expel all British AIOC staff, the matter was escalated to the UN Security Council by the British Government; again, Iran rejected the validity of the Council and proceeded with its aim of nationalisation. The AIOC responded by renaming the company The British Petroleum Company Ltd., and formed a consortium (The Iranian Oil Participants Ltd.) to deal with the new National Iranian Oil Company. The British Government, and the company, had underestimated the determination of Mossadegh and his supporters: … No imperial business leader could have failed to observe the Iranian nationalization in 1951 as an example of worldwide failure of British governments to protect commercial interests from the predatory instincts of determined post-war economic nationalists' (from 'Narrative reporting and crises: British Petroleum and Shell, 1950-1958').
Mossadegh's determination to nationalise AIOC through negotiations with the company failed due to entrenched positions on both sides. The British Government, appalled at the loss of control over Iran's rich oil reserves, imposed economic sanctions and conducted military manoeuvres in the area. Ultimately they contrived a plot (Operation Boot) to oust Mossadegh. President Truman's government, on friendly terms with Iran, had been reluctant to commit the USA to any intervention in support of the British except as mediators. In fact, worried about Iranian instability, they sent financial and military aid to the Iranian Government and dissuaded the British from military intervention. Despite friendly relations between Iran and the USA, the latter continued with their covert operations there, which post-Second World War had concentrated on planting anti-Soviet propaganda to guard against the spread of communism.
Events escalated with the expulsion from Iran of British diplomats as well as AIOC employees from the country, and oil operations ceased. The Shah, in panic at the hostile atmosphere, fled to Rome. Truman's successor, Eisenhower, had no qualms. In the midst of the Cold War and fearing a Communist take-over in Iran (and with one eye on the oil reserves), he agreed to help the British with 'regime change'. In 1953 the British-supported, CIA-led coup (Operation Ajax) unseated the government of Prime Minister Mossadegh. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was restored to the throne and, of course, was thereafter indebted to the USA. Iran's struggle for democracy was snuffed out. The company's annual report from 1953 blandly states that there had been a 'change of government'.
The Shah's repressive grip on Iran was consolidated with USA support and the use of the hated SAVAK (secret police). There were attempts to overthrow him, including an assassination attempt, but the disparate anti-Shah groupings, a weakened secular leftist movement and a disorganised liberal middle class meant they came to nothing. When the extent of the USA involvement in the 1953 coup had emerged, Iranian public opinion hardened. Once a friend of Iran, the USA had overthrown a liberal and democratic, secular government and in so doing alienated all classes of society living under Pahlavi's repressive dictatorship. It was the first time the USA had overthrown a foreign government (in peacetime), and was not to be the last. America was now considered a traitorous enemy — the 'Great Satan'.
A movement to re-establish Iranian culture, as opposed to the Shah's imposed western-inspired culture, included the resurgence of Shia Islam. This was led by the charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini, a senior cleric who had long opposed the Shah's 'decadent' westernising ways and had been exiled for it. Formerly left-leaning and pro-democracy clerics eventually supported Khomeini's bid for power, either swayed by his proclamations of support for social justice, or by the ruthless force of his supporters. The 1979 Iranian Revolution was also greeted with enthusiasm by some international left-wing groups: 'If anyone tried to substitute this code [extreme sharia law] for the democratic and social demands of the masses they would get short shrift' (from 'Iran: the unfolding revolution' by Saber Nickbin). Khomeini's establishment of an Islamic theocracy showed that such optimism was misplaced.
Formerly left-leaning and pro-democracy clerics eventually supported Khomeini's bid for power
Since 1979, the diplomatic relationship between both the UK and the USA with Iran has remained volatile. Throughout the 1980s, Anglo-American support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, positive trade and diplomatic relations with Iran's regional rival Saudi Arabia, and a pro-Israel stance from both western nations only served to intensify the ill feeling between Iran and the United Kingdom and the United States. This was at its most deadly during the Iran hostage crisis, when 52 American diplomats and citizens were held hostage from 4 November, 1979, to 20 January, 1981. Student supporters of the revolution had staged a takeover of the USA embassy building in Tehran. Rescue attempts ordered by President Jimmy Carter failed spectacularly and resulted in eight deaths, which arguably contributed to his defeat in the 1980 presidential election.
The decade also ended with a notable expression of the ideological and cultural differences between Iran and the United Kingdom. In 1989 — in response to the publication in the UK the year before of Salman Rushdie's book 'The Satanic Verses'— Ayatollah Khomeini issued a call for the author's death. The Rushdie controversy extended far beyond Iran of course, but Khomeini's fatwa (which was in place until 1998) was a further example of the intense dislike and estrangement that had grown between Iran and both the UK and the USA. The tension between these nations remains.
