Back to the future: 1979-1989
All 'international relations' essays

Mikhail Gorbachev and the de-nuclearisation dream

The actions and achievements of the prominent Russian politician in the 1980s.

Essay

  • Author:
  • A staff writer
    National Library of Scotland

Mikhail Gorbachev is known for being the first real reforming General Secretary of the old Soviet Union.

Soon after his appointment as leader in 1985, he immediately set out his vision for a more open society. His attempts to reshape the economy were partly successful, despite being hampered by entrenched vested interests in both the departmental ministries and also the Communist Party itself.

'Glasnost' (transparency) was introduced by Gorbachev as a way of opening up the Soviet system to citizens' scrutiny with a view to improvement — from 1987, he accelerated the process using 'perestroika' (restructuring), including the introduction of private business. Arguably, this was too fast for the turning of a juggernaut like the Soviet system — many were still in favour of central control of the economy and baulked at anything that smacked of capitalism. It was not helped by the fact that the economy was suffering a steep decline, only partly hidden by Soviet official statistics (from 'The impact of Gorbachev's policies on Soviet economic statistics: a conference report', CIA, 1987).

Action against nuclear weapons

Fascinating though these changes were — particularly to the Soviet Union's Cold War adversaries — Gorbachev's most remarkable aim was his determination to rid the world of nuclear weapons. This was a path that had been embarked on by his predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko, but had been met with distrust by the Americans. Within a few months of taking office, Gorbachev threw down the gauntlet to the USA by declaring a freeze on the deployment of missiles in Europe, which would expire in six months if the NATO deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles was not also withdrawn. They included a moratorium on all nuclear testing.

Cynics claimed that the failing Soviet economy desperately required divestment of their huge commitments to arms spending and the propping up of Soviet-friendly states around the world, and that this was the prime motivation behind Gorbachev's actions (from 'Gorbachev's economic program', 1988).

the USA administration was also very aware that they were dealing with a new type of Soviet leader

But in any case, Gorbachev's charm offensive, particularly amongst European leaders and USA allies such as South Korea, succeeded in lessening the perceived Soviet threat, certainly amongst European nations. The CIA saw it as an attempt 'to seed discord within NATO' (also from 'Gorbachev's economic program', 1988). His visit to the UK in 1984 fascinated Westerners, who saw him as a modern, urbane leader, with a sophisticated wife and confident and open manner. This was someone that UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she could do business with.

But his casting of the USA as the obstacle to arms limitation talks alarmed the Reagan administration. With a background of a growing anti-nuclear movement in Europe and the USA, the Americans were keen to frame the negotiations as a path towards nuclear weapons reduction. However, the USA administration was also very aware that they were dealing with a new type of Soviet leader with whom they could, in fact, have a constructive dialogue. Détente had been attempted before, and a weaker version of 'glasnost' had been tried, but never had a Soviet leader embarked on what appeared, at least to Western eyes, as such an ambitious undertaking. President Reagan was keen to meet with Gorbachev, despite the qualms of his more hawkish aides. He reasoned that they may as well call Gorbachev's bluff by agreeing to discussions on nuclear weapons reduction.

Gorbachev's meetings with Reagan

The two leaders met in Geneva in 1985 in a spirit of positivity and pragmatism, and established a good rapport. In fact, they got on so well that Reagan admitted 'you could almost get to like the guy' (from 'Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan', 1999). They were to meet several times more, in Washington in 1987 and in Moscow in 1988.

However, their meeting in Reykjavik in 1986 was the real breakthrough. The stakes were high: on the negotiating table were the reduction of strategic (long-range) weapons — the elimination of all Europe-based medium-range weapons; a strengthening of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty.

On the second point, the Soviets left aside the nuclear potential of France and the UK (a very large concession on their part; they were well aware of Prime Minister Thatcher's absolute belief in their deterrent effect, something they discussed when she visited Moscow in 1987). The two leaders went 'off-piste' and spent 10 hours talking with only their interpreters present. But the great stumbling block at Reykjavik was the USA commitment to the so-called 'Star Wars' project.

Reykjavik … was widely acknowledged as the turning point of the end of the Cold War

In 1983 the Americans had embarked enthusiastically on plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a space-based anti-ballistic missile system which in theory could intercept Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) thereby rendering nuclear weapons obsolete. The Soviets saw it as the USA gaining the upper hand in the arms race. President Reagan insisted that it could be a shared initiative, perhaps overseen by an international body such as the UN. Gorbachev dismissed this as a highly unlikely scenario, famously declaring that the USA would not even share the technicalities of its milking machines with them. However, Reagan's proposal was very far removed from his previous assertion that the Soviet Union was an untrustworthy 'evil empire', and indicated how far the Cold War mindset had thawed.

Reykjavik, despite its failures, was widely acknowledged as the turning point of the end of the Cold War. It paved the way for the signing of the historic Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, which abolished a whole category of nuclear weapons for the first time. As a result, the Soviet Union had destroyed 1,846 missiles, and the USA destroyed 846 missiles over the next four years.

By the time of the Moscow summit in 1988, Republican hawks had forced Reagan to be less facilitative so that the Soviets were not seen to gain the upper hand on their home turf. But nonetheless, the summit played well to the Russian public, and Gorbachev took the opportunity to push through more reforms, including the first elected legislature in Russia since the 1917 Revolution. He could not foresee that these reforms would, ironically, contribute to the eventual demise of the Soviet Union.

Beginning of the end of the Soviet Union

1991 saw the two sides in negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), but by this time, Gorbachev was in a weaker position. The Soviet military was opposed to further concessions, as they saw it. Gorbachev also faced increasing opposition to his economic reforms from all sides — Communist Party hardliners who longed for the certainties of the old Soviet Union, and others who believed his reforms did not go far enough.

His decentralisation plans were a step too far for some of his influential Communist Party opponents: in August that year tanks appeared on the streets of Moscow in an attempted coup d'état. It failed, but the beginning of the end of the old Soviet Union had begun. By the end of that year, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic, along with 11 other leaders of the 12 republics, declared the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

De-nuclearisation today

Mikhail Gorbachev continues his work through his International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies. Since then, although new state actors now have nuclear weapons and political allegiances have changed, Gorbachev still claims that it is possible to de-nuclearise the world. If he, Reagan and Bush could agree, he asserts that all that is needed is the political will.

However, the outlook is not optimistic. This year, despite European pressure, President Donald Trump withdrew the USA from the historic INF Treaty, after complaining that Russia had violated its terms. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee has said that 'The withdrawal without a follow-on is the invitation for an arms race'. Currently, there is only one nuclear weapons treaty, START, between the two superpowers. It expires in 2021.

Further reading

  • 'An impossible dream: Reagan, Gorbachev, and a world without the bomb' by Guillaume Serina (London: Biteback Publishing, 2019) [available as a National Library of Scotland e-book].
  • 'Assessing Gorbachev' by Bhupinder Brar, in 'Economic and Political Weekly', Vol 29, No 24 (June 11, 1994), pages 1465-1475 [available at the National Library through the JSTOR eResource].
  • 'Dutch: A memoir of Ronald Reagan' by Edmund Morris (London: Harper Collins, 1999) [Shelfmark: Q4.200.154].
  • 'Gorbachev's economic program: Problems emerge: A report' by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Washington: CIA, 1988) [Shelfmark: PB9.216.21/14].
  • 'Gorbachev's struggle for economic reform' by Anders Åslund (London: Pinter, 1991) [Shelfmark: QP2.91.1667].
  • 'Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-eight hours that ended the Cold War' by Ken Adelman (New York, NY: Broadside Books, 2014) [available as a National Library e-book].
  • 'Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the end of the Cold War' by Norman A Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, Joseph M Siracusa (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008) [Shelfmark: HB2.208.11.1624].
  • Reykjavik: documents and materials (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1987) [National Library reference: Erick.Box.1.8 (17)].
  • 'The impact of Gorbachev's policies on Soviet economic statistics: a conference report [December, 1987]' United States Central Intelligence Agency — available to view at the CIA Library website.
  • 'The Gorbachev factor' by Archie Brown (Oxford: OUP, 1996) [Shelfmark: Q3.96.214].
  • The International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (The Gorbachev Foundation) — view Gorbachev Foundation website.
  • 'The Triumph of improvisation: Gorbachev's adaptability, Reagan's engagement, and the end of the Cold War' by James Wilson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014) [available as a National Library e-book].
  • 'Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to Great Britain, April 5-7, 1989: Documents and materials'. (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1989 [National Library reference: Erick.Box.1.66(4)].
  • 'Way out there in the blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the end of the Cold War' by Frances FitzGerald (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000) [Shelfmark: H3.202.0918].

 

All 'international relations' essays